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FROM INACTION TO EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING:  
THE INFLUENCE OF THE ETHICAL CULTURE OF ORGANIZATIONS ON EM-
PLOYEE RESPONSES TO OBSERVED WRONGDOING 
 
Putting measures in place to prevent wrongdoing in organizations is important, but de-
tecting and correcting wrongdoing is just as vital. Employees who observe wrongdoing 
should therefore be encouraged to respond in a manner that supports corrective action. 
This paper examines the influence of the ethical culture of organizations on employee 
responses to observed wrongdoing. The findings show that, contrary to transparency 
and congruency of management, many other dimensions of ethical culture were nega-
tively related to inaction and external whistleblowing and positively related to direct in-
tervention, reporting to management and calling an ethics hotline. The model used for 
ethical culture explained 27.5% of intended responses by employees. 
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Preventing wrongdoing in and by organizations is a significant responsibility and chal-
lenge for organizations, from a strategic (Schnatterly, 2003), financial (Karpoff, Lee, & Mar-
tin, 2008), legal (Bamberger, 2006), societal (Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006), and ethical 
(Kaptein, 2008a) perspective. However, it is an illusion to believe that wrongdoing can be 
avoided entirely (Treviño & Nelson, 1999). Even with the best preventative measures in 
place, wrongdoing still occurs. In keeping with the recommendations of the U.S. Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for Organizations, it is therefore desirable that organizations detect and 
correct wrongdoing as it arises . 
Employees are a “critical” (Miceli, Near & Dworkin, 2008: 2), “increasingly impor-
tant” (Miceli & Near, 2005: 100) source for detecting wrongdoing (Miethe, 1999). Dyck, 
Morse and Zingales (2008), for example, show that 18.3% of the corporate fraud cases in 
large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004 were detected and brought forward by em-
ployees. An analysis of 360 instances of fraud in organizations in Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa by KPMG (2007) shows that anonymous tipping by employees was the primary source 
of detection: 25% of the frauds were brought forward by employees. Failing to create the op-
portunity for internal reporting of wrongdoing “foolishly invites catastrophe” as Callahan 
(2002: 195) puts it. Therefore it is crucial that organizations encourage employees who sus-
pect or observe wrongdoing not to look the other way or stick their head in the sand, but to 
respond in such a manner that the wrongdoing and wrongdoer(s) can be stopped and corrected 
(Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009). For this reason, the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Section 806, 301 and 1107) encourage organizations to provide suffi-
cient opportunity to employees for internal reporting of wrongdoing. 
As Miceli, Near and Dworkin (2009) remark, employees who are aware of wrong-
doing often refrain from reporting it. According to Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005), 
one reason for this is that organizations often do not welcome reports of wrongdoing. The 
question then is how organizations can create an environment that welcomes the disclosure of 
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wrongdoing. According to Berry (2004), the ethical culture of organizations plays a crucial 
role in stimulating employees to report wrongdoing. In this paper we will examine how the 
different dimensions of ethical culture relate to different responses of employees to observed 
wrongdoing. The scientific contribution of this paper is threefold.  
First, although many studies of the relationship between situational variables, such as 
national culture (Chiu, 2003; Patel, 2003; Tavakoli, Keenan, & Crnjak-Karanovic, 2003), or-
ganizational structure (King, 1999), and type and seriousness of the wrongdoing (Near et al., 
2004) and employees‟ response to observed wrongdoing have been conducted, the ethical cul-
ture of organizations as such has not been empirically examined. In this paper, the Corporate 
Ethical Virtues Model (Kaptein, 2008b), consisting of eight dimensions, will be used to assess 
the ethical culture of organizations. The model was developed to understand and explain un-
ethical behavior by employees. In this paper, we will examine whether the model can also 
help us to understand the response of employees when they observe wrongdoing. 
Second, whereas most research in the field focuses on internal and/or external whis-
tleblowing (Lewis, 2001; Miceli et al., 2008; Miethe, 1999), this paper also examines report-
ing wrongdoing via the regular chain of command, that is, to management as well as resolving 
the wrongdoing by, for example, approaching the wrongdoer directly. Whether inaction can 
be explained by the ethical culture of organizations is also examined. An examination of the 
five different responses may improve our understanding of the way in which ethical culture 
and its dimensions are related to each response and the way in which the responses are related 
to each other. For organizations in particular it is relevant to know how different, complemen-
tary – as opposed to one or two individual - responses of employees contribute to detecting 
and correcting wrongdoing in the organization. Furthermore, it is relevant to include direct 
intervention and reporting via the regular chain of command, as these responses may well be 
more efficient, effective and ethical ways to respond to wrongdoing than internal or external 
whistleblowing. 
  5 
Third, whereas most studies use data obtained from students (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; 
Zhuang, Thomas & Miller; 2005), a single sector, such as the federal government (Miceli, 
Rehg, Near, & Ryan, 1999), or specific function, such as internal auditors (Miceli & Near, 
1994), nurses (King, 2001), or managers (Keenan, 2002), this paper uses a broad sample of 
the U.S. working population. Such a sample helps us to draw more generic conclusions about 
employee responses to observed wrongdoing. It also provides insight into the ethical culture 
of U.S. organizations at present and the responses it encourages among employees who ob-
serve wrongdoing. 
  
HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Responses to observed wrongdoing 
 
Employees who observe wrongdoing are faced with the question “Do I stand up or do 
I stand by?” (Miceli & Near, 2006), “Do I tell or do I not tell?” (Berry, 2004), or “Do I snitch 
or do I not snitch” (Pershing, 2003). When employees refrain from taking action, they become 
“inactive observers” (Miceli & Near, 1992) or “silent observers” (Rothschild & Miethe, 
1999), which is undesirable when the norm is to prevent, detect and correct wrongdoing (Mi-
celi et al., 2008).
1
 When employees decide to take action, different options are available (cf., 
Elliston, 1982; Hirschman, 1970; Jubb, 1999; Miceli & Near, 1984). The literature on whis-
tleblowing draws a distinction between internal and external whistleblowing. Whistleblowing 
is mostly defined as “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, 
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organiza-
tions that may be able to effect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985: 4). Internal whistleblowing is 
usually defined as reporting wrongdoing outside the regular chain of command via, for exam-
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ple, confidential hotlines (Miceli et al., 2008). External whistleblowing can then be defined as 
reporting wrongdoing to someone outside the organization who may be able to stop or correct 
it. Most external whistleblowers first blow the whistle internally (Miceli et al., 2008; Roth-
schild & Miethe, 1999) as the latter is less risky for the whistleblower (Miceli & Near, 2002) 
and also less detrimental to the organization (Hassink et al., 2007). In contrast, external whis-
tleblowing may lead to public embarrassment, government scrutiny, hefty fines, and litigation 
(Berry, 2004) as it not only exposes internal wrongdoing, but also a failing organization – one 
which is unable to stop and correct wrongdoing itself. 
Although most research on employees‟ response to observed wrongdoing focuses on 
internal and external whistleblowing (cf., Miceli et al., 2008), other responses exist that tend 
to be preferred by ethicists (Bowie, 1982; DeGeorge, 1986; Velasquez, 2005) and organiza-
tions alike. These are often referred to in codes of conduct and whistleblowing policies (Has-
sink, de Vries, & Bollen, 2007). Employees who observe wrongdoing can resolve the wrong-
doing by approaching and confronting the wrongdoer(s) directly (Jubb, 1999).
2
 This gives the 
wrongdoer(s) the opportunity to take corrective action. It also gives the responding employees 
the opportunity to verify their interpretation of the alleged wrongdoing. For example, King 
(2001) found that nurses who observed unintentional wrongdoing preferred to approach the 
wrongdoer directly in order to give the wrongdoer the opportunity to explain and correct their 
conduct and to learn from the experience so as to avoid repeat behavior in future. Therefore, if 
employees successfully resolve the wrongdoing through direct intervention, unreported 
wrongdoing to management is, contrary to the view of Miceli et al. (2008), not necessarily 
negative.
3
 If the wrongdoer does not respond adequately, the observer can take the next step 
and report the wrongdoing to the supervisor in question, or when the wrongdoer is a supervi-
sor, the manager in question. Should the supervisor or manager not respond appropriately, 
employees could report the wrongdoing to higher management until the report is handled sa-
tisfactorily. 
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In this paper, we will study five types of responses of employees who observe wrong-
doing: inaction, direct intervention, reporting to management, calling an internal ethics hot-
line, and external whistleblowing. On the one hand, the challenge for organizations is to en-
courage employees who detect wrongdoing to take action and to discourage inaction so that 
the wrongdoing and the wrongdoer can be corrected. On the other hand, the challenge is to 
ensure that employees take action internally rather than blow the whistle externally in order 
for the organization to draw on its self-correcting capacity so as to avoid external repercus-
sions. 
 
Ethical culture 
 
Research shows that the motives of internal and external whistleblowers are not purely 
altruistic, but mixed. Dozier and Miceli (1985) describe these motives as prosocial in that 
whistleblowers weigh the costs and benefits of reporting wrongdoing to themselves and others 
(Miceli & Near, 1985). Given that they consider the effectiveness of their actions, whistleb-
lowers are not naïve (Near & Miceli, 1995; Miceli & Near, 2002). Dozier and Miceli (1985) 
are of the first scholars who have pointed to the relevance of situational stimuli that may en-
courage or discourage reporting wrongdoing. Empirical research even suggests that situational 
stimuli explain more variance in the decisions of whistleblower to act than individual va-
riables do (Near & Miceli, 1996). According to Miceli and Near (1984), it is therefore impor-
tant that the stimuli situated in the organizational context enable the desired response. When 
the organizational context is unfavorable employees tend to report externally or not at all (Mi-
celi and Near, 1992). 
The ethical culture of an organization is one component of the organizational context. 
The ethical culture of an organization is usually defined as those elements of the perceived 
organizational context that impede unethical behavior and promote ethical behavior (Treviño 
  8 
and Weaver, 2003). Ethical culture represents part of the informal organizational context 
(Murphy, 1988), whereas policies, processes and programs represent part of the formal orga-
nizational context (Ferrell, Thorne LeClair, & Ferrell, 1998). Sims and Keenan (1998) found 
that formal organizational policies that support external whistleblowing were not significant 
predictors of its occurrence, whereas informal elements were significant.
4
 
Culture resides in the eyes of the beholder (cf., Schein, 2004; Weick, 1995) in that it 
involves perceptions, interpretations, experiences, and observations. It is held to be important 
because it is bound to influence the response of employees who observe wrongdoing. Five, 
partly overlapping reasons can be given for this. A first, normative, reason is that the culture 
of an organization embodies the values and norms of the organization. It indicates acceptable 
and unacceptable behavior that employees take into account when they decide how to re-
spond. Miceli and Near (1984) note that employees rationalize inaction by attributing it to an 
organizational context perceived to be unreceptive to action. Employees are also less likely to 
act in a certain manner if they believe that the action would harm the existing organizational 
culture (Miceli & Near, 1994). A second, power-related reason is that the stronger the shared 
culture, the greater the legitimacy employees feel to act in a manner that is consistent with the 
dominant culture (cf., Miceli & Near, 1994). This sense of legitimacy imparts a degree of 
power to urge others to follow up reports of wrongdoing, as they and others know that res-
ponding to observed wrongdoing is consistent with the prevailing culture. A third reason con-
cerns the expected consequences of actions. Expectancy theory holds that the expected conse-
quences of an action influence the behavior of employees (Miceli & Near, 1985). If em-
ployees, for example, believe that reports will be handled appropriately, they are more likely 
to take action than when they expect management to ignore reports. A fourth reason is related 
to the fact that the organizational culture is relevant not only to those who detect wrongdoing, 
but also to the recipients of reports of wrongdoing (Near & Miceli, 1995). Employees will 
project their perception of the organizational culture on to that of the recipient and anticipate 
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their actions accordingly. A fifth reason is that ethical culture influences the prevalence of 
wrongdoing in organizations. Attribution theory holds that individuals‟ perception of the 
causal mechanism underlying events influences their decision on how to respond to these 
events (Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003). When employees perceive the wrongdoing as 
an effect of a failing ethical culture, they are less likely to respond. Conversely, they are more 
likely to respond if they believe the wrongdoing to be an aberration and that the organization 
can and should learn from its shortcomings in order to prevent similar wrongdoing in future. 
To date, the only existing model for the ethical culture of an organization is the Corpo-
rate Ethical Virtues Model, abbreviated as CEV Model, which will be used in this paper. Fol-
lowing Solomon‟s virtue-based theory of business organizations (1992, 1999), Kaptein (1998, 
2008b) posits that the virtuousness of an organization can be determined by the extent to 
which the organizational culture promotes ethical and impedes unethical employee behavior. 
A corporate ethical virtue is a dimension of the ethical culture that promotes ethical behavior 
and impedes unethical behavior. To define desirable corporate ethical virtues, Kaptein (1998) 
conducted a qualitative analysis of 150 diverse cases of wrongdoing caused by a failing orga-
nizational culture. In another study, the resulting list of items was subjected to exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses resulting in eight dimensions of the ethical culture of organiza-
tions (Kaptein, 2008b). Below a hypothesis is developed on the relation between each dimen-
sion and each of the five possible responses of employees to observed wrongdoing in their 
organization: inaction, direct intervention, reporting to management, calling an ethics hotline, 
and external whistleblowing. 
 
The Cultural Dimension of Clarity 
 
The first cultural dimension is clarity, which is defined in the CEV Model as the extent 
to which the organization makes ethical expectations, such as values, norms and principles 
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concrete and understandable to employees. Clarity concerns the manner in which employees 
are expected to conduct themselves in order to behave ethically towards stakeholders, the or-
ganization and each other. We expect that the more clarity there is, the more likely employees 
who observe wrongdoing are to take positive action, i.e. through direct intervention, reporting 
to management and calling an ethics hotline, and the less likely they are to refrain from taking 
action or blowing the whistle externally. 
According to Near and Miceli (1985), the degree of clarity of the organizational con-
text may determine how an employee responds to observed wrongdoing. Not only will more 
clarity increase the likelihood of an observer considering an act to be wrong, they are more 
likely to think that the wrongdoer knows or should have known that they are committing a 
transgression and that recipients of the report would also consider the act to be wrong. Clarity 
provides grounds on which to call the alleged wrongdoer to account and to denounce the 
wrongdoing. The more clarity there is, the more freedom, power and confidence an observer 
will have to bring the transgression to light (Near & Miceli, 1987). The greater the clarity 
there is, the greater the responsibility employees will feel responsible to uphold it. Tolerating 
wrongdoing would suggest that the wrongdoing is “not that wrong” and create confusion, thus 
undermining clarity. Reporting wrongdoing in the hope that it will be corrected therefore con-
tributes to preserving the current level of clarity. By reporting wrongdoing employees also 
evince their understanding of and commitment to the norm that is violated (Callahan, Dwor-
kin, Fort, & Schipani, 2002). The greater the level of clarity, the more employees will regard 
inaction as rendering them complicit (Jubb, 1999) since tolerating behavior that is considered 
to be wrong by the organization can encourage further wrongdoing. Greenberger et al. (1987) 
argue that employees are more likely to blow the whistle internally on behaviors that are un-
ambiguously wrong and which colleagues disapprove of. For this reason, Callahan et al. 
(2002) posit that a code of conduct is the cornerstone of an organizational program to encour-
age internal whistleblowing. Miceli and Near (2002) also argue that organizations that wish to 
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stimulate internal reporting should provide clear prescriptions on what constitutes wrong-
doing. 
The relationship between clarity and external whistleblowing is less clear. When an 
organization has no explicit standards to distinguish right form wrong, external reporting is 
less likely because it is more difficult to hold the organization accountable for conduct that 
has not been defined as wrong. At the same time, when the organization violates its own stan-
dards, it makes it easier to report externally because it provides evidence that the organization 
has violated a relevant norm: the organization cannot hide behind the specious argument that 
it was not aware of the existence or relevance of the norm. Violating one‟s own standards can 
be a reason to report, but external reporting is most likely in the event of transgressing a norm 
that is defined by society or stakeholders as legitimate and wrong to violate (Chung et al., 
2004; Miceli et al., 1991). In such cases, it is not the clarity of organizational norms that is 
relevant, but the clarity of external norms. So we do not expect to find a relationship between 
clarity of organizational norms and external whistleblowing. To conclude, Hypothesis 1 reads 
as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1:Regarding the response of employees who observe wrongdoing, the cultural 
dimension of clarity is positively related to intervening directly, reporting to management, 
and calling an ethics hotline, negatively related to inaction, and unrelated to external 
whistleblowing. 
 
The Cultural Dimension of Congruency of Local and Senior Management 
 
A second and third dimension of the ethical culture of organizations is the congruency 
of local and senior management, which refers to the extent to which managers apply organiza-
tional standards to their own behavior. In this capacity, managers act as role models, which is 
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important as it reinforces the importance of ethics and the clarity of standards. It is also impor-
tant since employees are more likely to report upward if they trust their superiors (Near & Mi-
celi, 1985). Blackburn (1988) found that within a single organization, internal whistleblowers 
are more likely than inactive observers to believe that their managers cared about employees 
and could be counted on to do what they said. Near and Miceli (1996) found that internal 
whistleblowers report greater value congruence with management than inactive observers. 
This corresponds with the theory of value congruence as developed by Enz (1988) that holds 
that employees whose values correspond to that of management have relatively greater power 
in the organization than those whose values deviate. Furthermore, it is more likely that a 
transgression will be reported to a manager if the manager has not committed the same type of 
transgression in the past or is not implicated in the current observed transgression. We there-
fore expect a positive relation between congruency of management and reporting observed 
wrongdoing to management. 
With regard to reporting observed wrongdoing to an ethics hotline, we expect a posi-
tive relationship with congruency of senior management and a negative relationship with local 
management. An ethics hotline is usually considered as a channel to report wrongdoing when 
local management is implicated in the wrongdoing or when previous reports of wrongdoing 
were handled unsatisfactorily. Employees who call an ethics hotline are in fact blowing the 
whistle on their immediate superiors (Elliston, 1982) as supervisors are often held responsible 
for the misdemeanors of their subordinates (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). The greater the con-
gruency of local management, the less likely employees are to contact the ethics hotline and 
the more likely they are to notify their supervisor or other local manager. At the same time, 
employees may perceive the ethics hotline as an extension of senior management as it often 
serves as means to report wrongdoing higher up in the organization. Callahan and Dworking 
(1994) note that the more senior the managers who are involved in the wrongdoing, the less 
useful a hierarchical reporting system is as it amounts to reporting wrongdoing to the wrong-
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doer, even if the system allows for anonymous reporting. For these reasons, congruency of 
senior management is expected to be positively related to the use of ethics hotlines.  
Regarding external whistleblowing, we expect a negative relationship with both local 
and senior management. When managers are not viewed as role models and therefore less 
trustworthy, employees are more likely to report wrongdoing to an external organization or 
institution they trust, because employees will report to those persons or organizations they feel 
comfortable with. Also the more management is implicated in the wrongdoing, the less likely 
the report will be dealt with effectively and the more external reporting will be perceived as 
the only option to stop and correct the wrongdoing (cf., Miethe, 1999). 
The relationship between congruency of management and resolving the wrongdoing 
directly is less easy to predict. On the one hand, the less congruent management is, the less 
employees will be able to rely on the intervention of management to stop the wrongdoing and 
the more they will be required to take action themselves. At the same time, the less congruent 
management is, the less supported and backed up by management employees will feel to re-
solve the wrongdoing themselves (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Employees will 
not be able to count on management to correct wrongdoing when wrongdoers do not respond 
satisfactorily to employees‟ attempts to resolve the wrongdoing directly. Wrongdoers may 
also take this into account in deciding how to deal with colleagues who report wrongdoing to 
them. For example, it is easier for wrongdoers to disregard reports of colleagues when they 
know that when those colleagues decide to report to management, management will not take 
action. Possible threats or “scare tactics” (King, 2001: 10) of employees to report to manage-
ment are less credible in those situations. On balance, we expect that congruency of manage-
ment to be positively related to resolving the wrongdoing directly as the presence of role 
modeling has a greater impact than the absence of role modeling. As a consequence, we ex-
pect congruency of management to be unrelated to inaction because more congruence leads to 
more reporting to management, but also to less direct intervention by employees.  
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Hypothesis 2: Regarding the response of employees who observe wrongdoing, the cultural 
dimension of congruency of local management is positively related to direct intervention 
and reporting to management, negatively related to calling an ethics hotline and external 
whistleblowing, and unrelated to inaction. 
  
Hypothesis 3: Regarding the response of employees who observe wrongdoing, the cultural 
dimension of congruency of senior management is positively related to intervening direct-
ly, reporting to management and calling an ethics hotline, negatively related to external 
whistleblowing, and unrelated to inaction. 
 
The Cultural Dimension of Feasibility 
 
The next dimension of the ethical culture of organizations is feasibility, which refers to 
the extent to which the organization makes sufficient time, budgets, equipment, information 
and authority available to enable employees to fulfill their responsibilities. In the CEV Model, 
the dimension of feasibility is relevant because the more pressure employees are under to per-
form and meet targets and the fewer resources they have available, the higher the risk of 
wrongdoing. We do not expect to find any relationship between feasibility and the five types 
of responses of employees who observe wrongdoing. On the one hand, the lower the feasibili-
ty, the fewer resources employees have to report and the less likely they are to report. Report-
ing can, for example, be time-consuming for the observer as well as the recipient. When ob-
servers and possible recipients of reports are busy, there is less opportunity to meet each other 
and to discuss the wrongdoing. Low levels of feasibility may also stimulate employees to be-
lieve that stopping the wrongdoing is not a priority because meeting targets is more urgent. 
On the other hand, the lower the levels of feasibility, the more likely it is that employees will 
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consider it to be the cause of the observed wrongdoing and the more reason they may have to 
report it in order for the wrongdoer and organization to learn from it. It is difficult to deter-
mine which of the two factors has a greater impact on the responses of employees. Therefore, 
we expect that these factors counterbalance each other and that the net effect of feasibility on 
the responses of employees who observe wrongdoing is negligent. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Regarding the response of employees who observe wrongdoing, the cultural 
dimension of feasibility is unrelated to resolving wrongdoing directly, reporting to man-
agement, calling an ethics hotline, external whistleblowing and inaction. 
 
The Cultural Dimension of Supportability 
 
Another cultural dimension is supportability, which refers to the extent to which the 
organization stimulates identification with the ethics of the organization among employees. 
Tyler and Blader (2005), for example, found that when employees are encouraged to identify 
with the ethical values of their organization, they will be more intrinsically motivated to 
comply with the ethical standards of the organization. The more employees identify with the 
ethics of an organization, the more their sense of identity will be threatened or harmed by the 
transgressions of others (Nieuwenboer, 2008) and the more likely it is that they will take ac-
tion to stop and correct the wrongdoing, whether through direct intervention, reporting to 
management or calling an ethics hotline. Miceli et al. (1991), for example, found that com-
mitment to the organization correlated with the propensity of corporate auditors to report 
wrongdoing. Furthermore, if the wrongdoer is perceived to be committed to the ethics of the 
organization, employees are more inclined to interpret the wrongdoing as a mistake and to be-
lieve that the wrongdoer would be prepared to learn from it, making them more likely to ap-
proach the wrongdoer directly and resolve the wrongdoing. 
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With regard to external whistleblowing, there is probably no relationship with the cul-
tural dimension of supportability. Several empirical studies show that the greater majority of 
external whistleblowers consider themselves to be very loyal employees and therefore first 
blew the whistle internally. Only after the organization failed to respond adequately to internal 
reports did they blow the whistle externally (Miceli et al., 2008b). The dimension of suppor-
tability, however, concerns not the extent to which employees are loyal or committed to their 
organization, but the extent to which they support the ethics of the organization. However, we 
may expect that the more committed employees are to the organization, the more they also 
support the ethics of the organization, and vice versa. Like the dimension of clarity, supporta-
bility is related to internal organizational norms. External whistleblowing, however, is primar-
ily related to identification with external norms. In that sense, we do not expect a relationship 
between external whistleblowing and the cultural dimension of supportability. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Regarding the response of employees who observe wrongdoing, the cultural 
dimension of supportability is positively related to intervening directly, reporting to man-
agement and calling an ethics hotline, negatively related to inaction, and unrelated to ex-
ternal whistleblowing. 
 
The Cultural Dimension of Transparency 
 
Transparency is also a cultural dimension in the CEV Model, which refers to the de-
gree to which wrongdoing and its consequences are visible to those who can act upon it inter-
nally - wrongdoers as well as colleagues, supervisors, managers, and subordinates. As internal 
reporting is a means of improving internal transparency (Miceli et al., 2008b), we expect that 
the more internal transparency there already is, the less likely it is that employees will report 
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wrongdoing to the wrongdoer, management, and ethics hotline and the more likely it is that 
they will refrain from taking action or blowing the whistle externally.  
Employees will report wrongdoing if they think that it will be effective; when it brings 
something to light that the recipient is unaware of. When employees think that management is 
already aware of the wrongdoing, they will have less or no reason to inform management. The 
same applies to the wrongdoer: when the observer believes that the wrongdoer is aware of 
their behavior and its effects, the observer will have less or no reason to approach the wrong-
doer. And when employees think that others too, are aware of the wrongdoing - the more 
transparent the organization is, the more likely this is - and that is has already been reported 
(cf., Dozier & Miceli, 1985), the less they will feel compelled to take action. 
There are some mechanisms that might weaken the expected negative relationship be-
tween transparency and internal reporting. The higher the perceived transparency of the or-
ganization, the more observers will believe that others are aware of their observation of 
wrongdoing and therefore whether and how they responded to the observed wrongdoing. The 
more transparent the organization, and the more the organization encourages a positive re-
sponse, the more employees will be stimulated to respond positively since their response is 
visible to others. Another mechanism is that the more transparent the organization is, the more 
visible the effects of wrongdoing are, thus the more convincing evidence observers have on 
the basis of which to report the wrongdoing, and the more likely it is that they will report (Mi-
celi & Near, 1985). A third mechanism is that the more transparent the organization is, the 
more employees will feel obliged to report wrongdoing so as to preserve existing levels of 
transparency. 
Like inaction, we expect external whistleblowing to be positively related to transpa-
rency. External whistleblowing usually takes place only after employees have reported the 
wrongdoing internally (cf., Miceli & Near, 1992). Only when management is aware of the 
wrongdoing but have not taken satisfactory action do employees have a legitimate reason to 
  18 
report externally (DeGeorge, 1986). So the greater the internal transparency of an organiza-
tion, the greater the visibility and awareness of wrongdoing, thus the higher likelihood that 
employees will report externally. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Regarding the response of employees who observe wrongdoing, the cultural 
dimension of transparency is positively related to inaction and external whistleblowing 
and negatively related to intervening directly, reporting to management, and calling an 
ethics hotline. 
 
The Cultural Dimension of Discussability 
 
The dimension of discussability in the CEV Model is defined as the extent to which 
ethical issues, such as ethical dilemmas and alleged wrongdoing, can be discussed internally. 
The process of reporting wrongdoing is a matter of communication (King, 1997). Reporting 
wrongdoing is to make things discussable; to break through communication barriers (Miceli et 
al., 2008b). In organizations with a low level of discussability, where a “code of silence” 
(Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007) or an atmosphere prevails that is antagonistic to the exposure of 
wrongdoing (Miceli & Near, 2002), employees will believe that dissidence and speaking up is 
undesirable (Miceli & Near, 1984). In organizations with a low level of discussability, the 
messenger of wrongdoing will be retaliated against and the focus misdirected from resolving 
the wrongdoing to redressing, reprising and resenting the messenger (Keenan, 1990; Miceli & 
Near, 1994). Dworkin and Baucus (1998) distinguish four types of retaliation against reporters 
of wrongdoing: nullification, isolation, defamation, and expulsion. Research conducted by 
Alford (2007), for example, describes how whistleblowers are regarded as “nuts and sluts” 
and treated as mentally disturbed or morally suspect. Retaliation could also mean that actions 
that would otherwise be taken are not taken, such as a promotion (Miceli et al., 2008b). If the 
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possibility of retaliation exists, the willingness of employees to report wrongdoing will de-
cline due to the costs they may have to bear as a result (Miceli et al., 2009). However, in or-
ganizations where dialogue and feedback are standard practice (Heard & Miller, 2006), where 
there is empathy and an attempt to understand and listen (Sims & Keenan, 1998), the willing-
ness of employees to report wrongdoing internally is greater, because it preserves the prevail-
ing norm of openness (Blackburn, 1988; Graham, 1993) and is appreciated by management 
and wrongdoers alike.  
With regard to the use of an ethics hotline, we do not expect discussability to have any 
influence due to two opposing mechanisms that are at work. On the one hand, the higher the 
level of internal discussability within a department, the less likely it is that employees will use 
an ethics hotline because the hotline serves as safety net for alleged wrongdoing that cannot 
be addressed among employees within the department or through the regular chain of com-
mand (Kaptein, 2002). On the other hand, employees will not use a hotline if they believe that 
it will be met with disapproval or retaliation (cf., Miceli, 2004). Whereas Miceli (2004) is 
quite skeptical about ethics hotlines due to the fact that she doubts whether it has led to any 
change, Callahan et al. (2002) assert that the mere existence of a hotline has symbolic value in 
that it signals an openness to dissent within the organization.  
Regarding external whistleblowing, we predict a negative relationship with discussa-
bility. The greater the level of internal discussability, the less likely employees are to report 
externally since they feel comfortable to address wrongdoing internally. To conclude, the next 
hypothesis reads as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Regarding the response of employees who observe wrongdoing, the cultural 
dimension of discussability is positively related to intervening directly and reporting to 
management, negatively related to inaction and external whistleblowing, and unrelated to 
calling an ethics hotline. 
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The Cultural Dimension of Sanctionability 
 
The final dimension in the CEV Model is sanctionability, which is defined as the ex-
tent to which employees believe that unethical behavior will be punished and ethical behavior 
will be rewarded, as well as the extent to which the organization learns from wrongdoing. 
When wrongdoing goes unpunished or is rewarded even, the implicit message is that wrong-
doing is acceptable or even desirable. The dimension of sanctionability concerns the conse-
quences not for employees who report wrongdoing, but for the wrongdoers. This dimension is 
especially relevant to employees who observe wrongdoing and proceed to assess the effec-
tiveness of reporting it. According to Near and Miceli (1995), correction and termination of 
wrongdoing are important predictors of the behavior of potential whistleblowers. Miceli and 
Near (1984) found that convincing evidence that corrective action would be taken appeared to 
be important to nearly all potential whistleblowers. If reports are not taken seriously, em-
ployees will conclude that it is futile to report, which reduces the likelihood that they will re-
port at all (cf., Miceli et al., 2008b). A high level of sanctionability, however, indicates that 
wrongdoing is not tolerated, which stimulates employees to take internal action. So we expect 
sanctionability to be positively related to direct intervention, reporting to management, and 
calling an ethics hotline. The higher the level of sanctionability, the less reason employees 
have to refrain from taking action internally and to report outside the organization. We there-
fore expect sanctionability to be negatively related to these two types of responses. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Regarding the response of employees who observe wrongdoing, the cultural 
dimension of sanctionability is positively related to intervening directly, reporting to man-
agement, and calling an ethics hotline and negatively related to inaction and external 
whistleblowing. 
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METHOD 
 
Sample and Procedure 
 
Data was collected from the U.S. working population. With the assistance of the panel 
database company, National Family Opinion, a representative sample was compiled of U.S. 
adults working for organizations that employ at least 200 people in fifteen selected industries. 
The privately registered, prescreened respondents to this blind survey received a nominal fi-
nancial reward for their participation. The data collection took place between July and Sep-
tember 2008, yielding 5,065 completed questionnaires.  
Of the respondents, 44% were female. With regard to job tenure, 6% had been work-
ing for less than a year at their current organization, 10% between 1 and 2 years, 16% between 
3 and 5 years, 16% between 6 and 10 years, and 51% for more than 10 years. Of the respon-
dents, 14% were aged 18-34, 41% between 35 and 49, and 45% were 50 or older. 28% of the 
respondents worked for an organization of 200 to 1,000 employees, 15% of 1,000 to 3,000 
employees, 9% of 3,000 to 5,000 employees, 11% of 5,000 to 10,000 employees, and 38% of 
more than 10,000 employees. As for hierarchical level, 38% of the respondents held a mana-
gerial position, 13% worked as supervisor, 12% as mid-level manager, 3% as senior manager 
or junior executive, and 2% as senior executive or director. A wide range of sectors were 
represented: Consumer Markets (16%), Government and Public Sector (14%), Healthcare 
(9%), Automotive (8%), Aerospace/Defense (7%), Electronics/Software (7%), Banking and 
Finance (7%), Pharmaceuticals (7%), Media and Communications (6%), Insurance (6%), 
Chemicals and Diversified Industrials (5%), Power and Utilities (4%), Real Es-
tate/Construction (2%), Forestry/Mining (1%), and Oil and Gas (1%). The respondents had 
the following job functions: Manufacturing/Production (14%), Operations/Service (13%), 
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Technology (10%), Sales/Marketing (9%), Research/Development/Engineering (9%), General 
Management/Administration (7%), Clerical/Support (7%), Finance/Accounting (5%), Quali-
ty/Safety/Environmental (4%), Training/Education (3%), Government/Regulatory Affairs 
(3%), Purchasing/Procurement (2%), Legal/Compliance (1%), Internal Audit/Risk Manage-
ment (1%), Public/Media Relations (1%), and other (11%). 
 
Dependent variable 
 
As in studies conducted by Ayers and Kaplan (2005), King (2001), Tavakoli et al. 
(2003), and Victor et al. (1993), respondents were requested to indicate how they are inclined 
to respond to observed wrongdoing in their organization. Although intentions are not identical 
to behavior (cf., Mesmer-Magnus and Viswervaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008b), examining 
intentions has the advantage that the questions can be answered by all respondents, not only 
those who have observed wrongdoing in the past. It also helps us, which is especially useful to 
organizations, to predict responses instead of retrospectively study employee behavior. More-
over, the measurement of dependent and independent variables is better aligned – i.e. what 
employees currently think they would do if they observed wrongdoing is a better reflection of 
the current ethical culture in their organization. Assessing what respondents have done when 
they observed wrongdoing would imply that for a good measurement the culture has to be as-
sessed for the same moment that respondents observed the wrongdoing, which would be diffi-
cult for respondents to reconstruct with risks of memory distortion and post-decisional justifi-
cation (Miceli & Near, 1988).  
Wrongdoing was operationalized in a list of 37 items (Kaptein, 2008a) that respon-
dents had to go through before answering questions related to the dependent variable. The five 
types of responses regarding observed wrongdoing, as described in this paper, were operatio-
nalized as “Try resolving the matter directly”, “Notify my supervisor or another manager”, 
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“Call the ethics or compliance hotline”, “Look the other way or do nothing” and “Notify 
someone outside the organization”. For each reaction the Likert response scale ranged from “1 
= strongly disagree” to “5 = strongly agree”, whereas the sixth response alternative was “6 = 
not applicable”, which was treated as missing value in the analysis. So respondents were able 
to select multiple responses. For all certainty, a question was included to establish whether the 
respondents‟ organization had an ethics or compliance hotline. In the event that a respondent 
indicated that there was no hotline, the response to call an ethics hotline was recoded as “not 
applicable”. To determine the explanatory value of the full model, a sixth variable, labeled as 
“total positive score”, was created, which is the aggregate score for each respondent on inter-
vening directly, reporting to management and calling an ethics hotline, minus inaction and 
external whistleblowing. 
 
Independent variables 
 
To measure the eight dimensions of the ethical culture of organizations, the question-
naire „The Ethics and Integrity Thermometer‟ was used.5 Items were measured using a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from “1 = strongly disagree” to “5 = strongly agree”. The Cronbach‟s al-
phas of all dimensions, as depicted on the diagonal of Table 1, were above Nunally‟s (1978) 
suggested minimum of 0.70.  
 
Control Variables 
 
Five control variables were first entered into the regression analyses: gender (two cat-
egories), age (eight categories), tenure (five categories), and hierarchical level (six categories) 
of respondents as well as the size of their organization (five categories). Miceli and Near 
(1988) found that whistleblowing was more likely among male observers: men have higher 
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self-esteem, a stronger internal locus of control, and display more initiative. Younger em-
ployees are more likely to blow the whistle because their personal investment in the organiza-
tion is lower than older employees (Near & Miceli, 1985). However, highly ambitious young-
er employees seeking to advance their career in the organization, the so-called fast-trackers 
(Miceli & Near, 1984), are less likely to blow the whistle (Near & Miceli, 1985), especially 
when they have a short tenure (Joseph, 2003). Research by Miceli and Near (1988) demon-
strates a positive relationship between tenure and whistleblowing. However, the meta-analysis 
of Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) shows that tenure is only positively related to 
actual whistleblowing and not to the propensity to blow the whistle. Because this study also 
includes responses other than whistleblowing, tenure has for all certainty been included as 
control variable. Regarding the fourth control variable, the hierarchical level of the respon-
dent, Keenan (2002) found that upper-level managers were more likely to blow the whistle on 
wrongdoing than middle-level and first-level managers. The reason for this is that upper-level 
managers have greater discretionary powers and are under less pressure to conform and thus 
feel more comfortable to blow the whistle. The size of the organization may also be relevant. 
Near and Miceli (1985) argue that larger organizations are less dependent upon individual 
employees and are therefore more likely to retaliate, which has a negative impact on the like-
lihood of internal whistleblowing. At the same time, it is easier to remain anonymous in big-
ger organizations, which has a positive impact on the likelihood of whistleblowing. 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 depicts the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of all research va-
riables. The bivariate correlations between the dependent and independent variables ranged 
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from r = 0.10 (p < .01) for feasibility and resolving directly to r = 0.47 (p < .01) for discussa-
bility and reporting to management as well as sanctionability and reporting to management. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 ------------------------------------ 
 
Table 2 depicts the results of the hierarchical regression analyses. Regarding inaction, 
one cultural dimension was positively related – transparency – and four dimensions were ne-
gatively related - clarity, supportability, discussability, and sanctionability. For intervening 
directly in observed wrongdoing, four dimensions were positively related – clarity, supporta-
bility, discussability, and sanctionability - whereas three dimensions were negatively related - 
congruency of local management, congruency of senior management, and transparency. Re-
porting to management was positively related to five dimensions – clarity, congruency of lo-
cal managers, supportability, discussability, and sanctionability - and negatively related to one 
dimension – transparency. Calling an ethics hotline was also positively related to five dimen-
sions – clarity, congruency of senior management, feasibility, supportability, and sanctionabil-
ity – and negatively related to one dimension – congruency of local management. External 
whistleblowing was positively related to one dimension – transparency – and negatively re-
lated to five dimensions – clarity, congruency of local management, congruency of senior 
management, discussability, and sanctionability. The final dependent variable, the total posi-
tive response, had four positive relationships – clarity, supportability, discussability, and sanc-
tionability – and one negative relationship – transparency. 
 
------------------------------------ 
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Insert Table 2 about here  
 ------------------------------------ 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study has examined the influence of the ethical culture of organizations on the 
potential response of employees to observed wrongdoing. We have examined the relationship 
between five types of responses and eight dimensions of ethical culture. A large sample of 
U.S. employees was used. The results of the study showed that three positive actions – inter-
vening directly, reporting to management and calling an ethics hotline – were positively re-
lated to at least four of the eight dimensions of ethical culture. The two negative responses – 
inaction and external whistleblowing – were negatively related to at least four of the eight di-
mensions of ethical culture. The model explained 27.5 of the variance of all responses com-
bined.  
The cultural dimensions of clarity, supportability and sanctionability were all positive-
ly related to the three positive actions. These three dimensions were also negatively related to 
inaction, and except for supportability, also to external whistleblowing. Congruency of local 
management was positively related only to reporting to management and negatively related to 
intervening directly, calling an ethics hotline and external whistleblowing. Congruency of se-
nior management was positively related only to calling an ethics hotline and negatively related 
to intervening directly and external whistleblowing. Feasibility was unexpectedly positively 
related to calling an ethics hotline. As expected, transparency was negatively related to direct 
intervention and reporting to management, and positively related to inaction and external 
whistleblowing. 
The findings of the study corroborate most of the hypotheses advanced in this study. 
Hypothesis 5 (supportability), 7 (discussability), and 8 (sanctionability) were fully supported. 
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As for the other hypotheses, no or opposing evidence for one or two of their elements was 
found. Regarding Hypothesis 1, clarity was negatively related to external whistleblowing 
while we expected no relationship. One possible explanation for this finding is that as clarity 
increases, employees are more inclined to report internally, and consequently, less likely re-
port externally. Clarity is indicative of the self-corrective capacity of an organization, and 
when a high level of clarity exists employees are bound to feel more comfortable to report in-
ternally. For Hypothesis 2 and 3 we found that both congruency of local and senior manage-
ment are not positively, but negatively related to direct intervention. Contrary to expectations, 
role modeling of management appears to lead to more reporting to management and less di-
rect intervention by employees. This might be because employees who regard their manager 
as good role models rely more on the intervention of their manager and consequently less on 
their own direct interventions to stop wrongdoing. They might regard the intervention of their 
manager as more effective or as a way to pass on the responsibility to their manager. It was 
also found that congruency of senior management was not related to reporting to manage-
ment. As this paper presented arguments that suggest a positive relationship, this finding 
might be explained by some limitations in the methodology employed, which is discussed in 
the next section. Regarding Hypothesis 4, we found that feasibility was positively related to 
calling an ethics hotline, which is quite surprising and also, at least in view of the theories and 
arguments presented in this paper, difficult to explain. Regarding Hypothesis 6, we found that 
transparency was not related to calling an ethics hotline. Apparently, the presented arguments 
for reporting to management and approaching the wrongdoer(s) - the more transparency, the 
more they know about wrongdoing that takes place, and the less meaningful it is for em-
ployees to report to them, so that transparency is negatively related to these responses - is not 
applicable to calling an ethics hotline. A possible explanation for this is that since it is less 
easy for employees to know who the recipients of a report to an ethics hotline may be – an 
ethics hotline is more faceless - the more difficult it is to assess what the recipients already 
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know. The current level of transparency of the organization could therefore be irrelevant to 
employees‟ decision to report or refrain from reporting to an ethics hotline. Future research 
could examine the explanation for this finding in greater detail. 
The contribution of this paper lies in its demonstration of the relevance of the ethical 
culture of organizations in explaining and predicting employees‟ response to observed wrong-
doing. The paper also demonstrates that the dimensions of ethical culture are not all positively 
related to a positive response and not all negatively related to a negative response of em-
ployees who observe wrongdoing. For example, transparency, which is a desirable organiza-
tional virtue for discouraging wrongdoing, was negatively related to the positive response of 
direct intervention and reporting to management, and positively related to the negative re-
sponse of inaction and external whistleblowing. One cultural dimension, namely feasibility, 
was hardly related to any of the potential responses. Ray (2006) regards whistleblowing as an 
ethical failure at the organizational level. Based on the current study we can confirm that ex-
ternal whistleblowing generally reflects a weakness in the ethical culture of the organization, 
except for transparency. Transparency was positively related to external whistleblowing, whe-
reas feasibility and supportability were not related to external whistleblowing. The relatively 
low explained variance (R²) for external whistleblowing, as we will discuss in the next sec-
tion, suggests that ethical culture is not the only relevant factor in explaining it. Considering 
inaction of employees as a failure of the ethical culture of organizations is generally also cor-
rect: only transparency was positively related. However, internal whistleblowing by calling an 
ethics hotline was positively related to five of the eight dimensions of ethical culture and ne-
gatively related only to congruency of local management. In contrast to the finding of Miceli 
and Near (1985), the present study suggests that inactive observers are confronted with a dif-
ferent organizational context than internal whistleblowers. Whereas Near and Miceli (1996) 
suggest that internal and external whistleblowing are related phenomena, we can confirm the 
finding of Dworkin and Baucus (1998) that we limit our understanding of the situational sti-
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muli for whistleblowing when we treat internal and external whistleblowing as one phenome-
non. But we should also incorporate, which is another contribution of this study, inaction and 
resolving wrongdoing directly to improve our understanding of how employees respond to 
observed wrongdoing. 
 
Research Implications and Limitations  
 
Although the explanatory power of the model used for ethical culture was satisfactory 
for reporting to management and for all five responses combined - the adjusted R² was .234 
and .275 respectively - the explanatory power for external whistleblowing and direct interven-
tion was low – .057 and .049 respectively. Low explained variances were also found in other 
studies of contextual stimuli for whistleblowing conducted by King (1997), Lee et al. (2004), 
Miceli and Near (2002), Rothwell and Baldwin (2007), and Victor et al. (1993). On the one 
hand, several other individual and situational factors could be added to better explain and pre-
dict employees‟ response to observed wrongdoing. In addition to the individual control va-
riables of gender, tenure and age used in the present study, factors such as educational level 
(Near & Miceli, 1995), religiosity and ethical ideology (Barnett, Bass, & Brown, 1996) and 
ethical judgment (Chiu, 2003) have also been found to be relevant in explaining whistleblow-
ing. Other relevant situational factors include role responsibility (Miceli, Dozier, & Near, 
1991), role prescription (Miceli & Near, 2002), type and seriousness of wrongdoing (Near et 
al., 2004), intentionality of wrongdoer (King, 2001), cohesion among employees (Horne, 
2001), national culture (Chiu, 2003; Patel, 2003; Tavakoli et al., 2003) and organizational 
structure (King, 1999). Not only would the inclusion of additional factors in future studies in-
crease the explanatory power of the model, the operationalization of the factors in the present 
study could probably also be improved upon.   
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Regarding the operationalization of the independent variables, this study has certain 
limitations, which have implications for future research. The objective of the study was to en-
hance our understanding of the influence of ethical culture on the response of employees who 
observe wrongdoing. A general model for the ethical culture of organizations was used to ex-
plain and predict wrongdoing. In future research, a complementary model could be developed 
for the ethical culture of organizations that is more focused on responses to observed wrong-
doing. In such a model, the dimensions of the CEV Model could be worked out in more detail. 
With regard to clarity, for example, it could specify whether employees have clarity on how 
they should respond to wrongdoing; regarding congruency of managers, what role model be-
havior they display in response to wrongdoing observed; regarding supportability, the extent 
to which employees are committed to, for example, the whistleblowing policy of the organiza-
tion; regarding feasibility, the availability of resources and different channels to report; re-
garding transparency, the extent to which employees are informed on how a report of wrong-
doing is handled; regarding discussability, the extent to which receivers of reports of wrong-
doing listen carefully and pose the right questions to get a good understanding of the reported 
wrongdoing; regarding sanctionability, whether reports of wrongdoing are appreciated. For a 
better understanding of the relationship between ethical culture and employee responses to 
observed wrongdoing, future research could also draw a distinction between the ethical cul-
ture of the immediate work environment of respondents and the broader organizational cul-
ture. In the current study we focused mainly on the ethical culture of the work unit. It is con-
ceivable that in seeking an explanation for the responses that fall beyond the work unit, such 
as reporting to senior management and calling an ethics hotline, the broader context increases 
in significance. Likewise, it is conceivable that the ethical culture of the work unit increases in 
significance in the event that the wrongdoing and response, such as reporting to the supervi-
sor, occurs within the work unit. 
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Regarding the operationalization of the dependent variables, this study has certain li-
mitations, which have implications for future research. This study focused on five types of 
responses of employees to observed wrongdoing. Future research could include a wider range 
of responses, such as reporting to different staff departments like HR, Legal, and Internal Au-
dit, different levels of management, types of hotlines and different external persons and organ-
izations. The exit option (Hirschman, 1970) could also be included as employees may respond 
to observed wrongdoing by transferring or leaving the organization. This study examined the 
propensity of employees to respond in a certain manner to observed wrongdoing, which 
should not be confused with what they actually do (cf., Mesmer-Magnus & Viswervaran, 
2005; Miceli et al., 2008b). Following Miceli and Near (2002), future research on the influ-
ence of ethical culture could also adopt a retrospective approach and examine the actual re-
sponse of employees in the face of observed wrongdoing. In that case, the challenge will be to 
adequately deal with potential problems of memory distortion and post-decisional justification 
(Miceli & Near, 1988) as discussed above. 
Another limitation of the present study concerns the data that was used. Valid and reli-
able data is difficult to collect when studying a sensitive topic like responding to wrongdoing 
(Near & Miceli, 1995). Although self-reported data may be flawed, it is widely used in studies 
on whistleblowing (cf., Miceli et al., 2008b) because it is important that data is collected ano-
nymously, which cannot corroborated by a party other than the one that observes wrongdoing 
(Miceli & Near, 1992). Given the cross-sectional data we used in this study, the cause and ef-
fect relationships cannot be established conclusively. For longitudinal research, employees 
would be required to identify themselves, which is likely to yield a low or biased response 
rate (Miceli & Near, 1994). While this study focused on the influence of culture on employee 
responses to observed wrongdoing, the responses of employees may very well also influence 
the ethical culture. For example, reporting wrongdoing could strengthen the commitment of 
employees to the organization (Miceli et al., 2009). Reporting could also increase transparen-
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cy (Miceli et al., 2008a) and lead to sanctions (Miceli et al. 2008) thereby reinforcing or 
changing perceptions of the existing culture (cf., Miceli & Near, 1985). Future research could 
also focus on how the response of recipients to reports of wrongdoing influence employee 
perceptions of the ethical culture of organizations. An interesting research question in this re-
gard is how ethical culture relates to the number of actual reports. The quality of ethical cul-
ture is negatively related to the frequency of wrongdoing (Kaptein, 2009), but as the present 
study shows, a healthy ethical culture generally results in a greater willingness to report 
wrongdoing. The question is therefore what the net effect is. Regarding reports of workplace 
injuries and illness in the construction industry, Probst, Brubaker and Barsotti (2008) already 
found that organizations with a poor safety climate had significantly higher rates of underre-
porting to authorities but also more injuries and illness leading to a similar number of reports 
to authorities than organizations with a positive climate. An important question is what the 
influence of the cultural dimension of transparency is because transparency increases the like-
lihood that wrongdoing is observed. At the same time transparency decreases the likelihood 
that wrongdoing occurs and, as found in this study, the likelihood that wrongdoing is resolved 
directly or reported to management. 
 
Managerial Implications 
 
Given the importance of preventing, detecting and correcting wrongdoing, organiza-
tions should create a culture that encourages employees who observe wrongdoing to take ap-
propriate action. Creating the infrastructure for internal whistleblowing via an ethics hotline or 
helpline is one way to encourage reporting. However, other studies tend to overlook responses 
like direct resolution of wrongdoing or reporting wrongdoing to a supervisor as a means to 
improve the self-correcting capacity of the organization. According to leading scholars in the 
field of whistleblowing, Miceli, Near and Dworkin (2008), most employees do not regard 
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open door policies as effective and they have not been successfully employed to encourage 
internal reporting of wrongdoing. The current study shows that the majority, 81% of em-
ployees, has the propensity to report to their manager, 52% are oriented towards direct resolu-
tion, while 44% are inclined to call an ethics hotline. Adopting an integrated approach to the 
different routes available for reporting wrongdoing can contribute significantly to managing 
and enhancing the self-correcting capacity of the organization. 
As illustrated in this study, the ethical culture of an organization is not only important 
in preventing wrongdoing, but also in encouraging employees to correct observed wrong-
doing. Four dimensions are especially relevant in encouraging employees to take positive ac-
tion such as intervening directly, reporting to management and calling an ethics hotline, in-
stead of refraining to take action or blowing the whistle externally. These four dimensions are 
clarity, supportability, discussability and sanctionability. Encouraging a positive response to 
observed wrongdoing among employees requires developing a culture where standards for 
ethical behavior are clear, employees are committed to the ethics of organization, where ethi-
cal dilemmas and issues are open for discussion and where transgressors are punished. How-
ever, improving transparency may lead to a decline in wrongdoing, but also to a decline in the 
propensity to report wrongdoing internally. The same applies to role modeling of local man-
agement. Managers should realize that better role model behavior may lead to a lower propen-
sity of employees to approach wrongdoers directly and to call the ethics hotline. To stimulate 
the right response, managers should be clear on how employees should respond when they 
observe wrongdoing. If a better ethical culture leads to less wrongdoing and a higher propen-
sity to report to management, an interesting question for management is what the combined 
effect of these two factors is on the number of reports they receive. In this study we have 
found that more reports of wrongdoing is not necessarily negative. On the contrary, it could 
even be a positive reflection of the ethical culture of an organization.   
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, (Pearson) Correlations and Scale Reliabilities for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Variables M SD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Inaction 1.93 .94                   
2. Direct inter-
vention 
3.35 1.11 
-.070**                  
3. Reporting 
management 
4.00 .85 
-.411** .192**                 
4. Calling ethics 
hotline 
3.31 1.08 
-.205** .047** .343**                
5. External whis-
tleblowing 
2.21 1.02 
.342** .096** -.129** .122**               
6. Total positive 
action 
6.18 2.80 
-.681** .495** .694** .537** -.427**              
7. Gender 1.56 .50 .020 .093** -.064** -.078** -.002 -.012             
8. Age 46.47 9.09 -.103** -.022 .028* .034* -.057** .066** .113**            
9. Tenure 3.96 1.28 -.013 -.001 -.028 .013 .003 .009 .064** .311**           
10. Hierarchical 
level 
1.61 1.01 
-.125** .220** .140** .065** -.058** .221** .096** .095** .051**          
11. Size 3.77 1.31 -.044** -.022 .033* .169** -.038** .113** .047** .013 .124** -.021         
12. Clarity 4.10 .79 -.270** .211** .356** .263** -.177** .441** -.035* .059** .044** .183** .097**        
13. Congruency 
local manage-
ment  
3.92 .89 
-.248** .147** .443** .221** -.225** .445** -.044** .008 -.058** .133** .056** .540**       
14. Congruency 
senior manage-
ment  
3.90 .94 
-.241** .123** .393** .276** -.226** .428** -.057** .024 -.034* .162** .026 .570** .676**      
15. Feasibility  3.47 .58 -.153** .108** .294** .191** -.113** .306** -.042** -.021 -.054** .063** -.004 .348** .501** .474**     
16. Supportabili-
ty  
3.91 .82 
-.271** .176** .392** .247** -.174** .438** -.026 .046** -.018 .152** .088** .489** .679** .548** .395**    
17. Transparency  3.53 .82 -.173** .129** .351** .232** -.128** .351** -.040** -.004 -.049** .140** .016 .428** .630** .562** .444** .650**   
18. Discussabili-
ty 
3.74 .80 
-.264** .198** .470** .240** -.210** .480** -.021 -.009 -.052** .148** .044** .514** .787** .650** .498** .716** .675**  
19. Sanctionabil-
ity  
3.68 .84 
-.274** .176** .470** .295** -.214** .495** -.012 -.011 -.057** .175** .058** .530** .776** .711** .521** .696** .771** .799** 
Note.  Estimated reliability coefficients are presented in parentheses on the diagonal. N=5,056. 
* p < .05    ** p < .01   
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Table 2 
Results of Hierarchical Regression on Intended Responses of Employees to Observed Wrong-
doing 
Variables 
 
Inaction Directly 
interven-
tion 
Reporting 
to manage-
ment 
Calling 
ethics hot-
line 
External 
whistleb-
lowing 
Total posi-
tive action 
       
Control variables       
Gender  .025  .089** -.053** -.069** -.003 -.015 
Age -.092** -.060**  .031*  .033* -.049**  .043** 
Tenure  .017  .009 -.018 -.002  .015 -.005 
Hierarchical level -.051**  .172**  .052** -.003  .007  .099** 
Size -.007 -.057**   .000  .158** -.016  .058** 
       
Clarity -.144**  .165**  .100**  .117** -.043*  .204** 
Congruency local management  .025 -.055*  .074** -.114** -.085** -.023 
Congruency senior management  .001 -.082** -.018  .101** -.100**  .031 
Feasibility  .001  .020  .026  .051*  .034  .024 
Supportability -.124**  .060**  .046*  .083**  .003 .125** 
Transparency  .147** -.054* -.068** -.001  .113** -.132** 
Discussability -.066* . 147**  .183** -.047 -.064*  .136** 
Sanctionability -.192**  .077*  .222**  .194** -.099**  .257** 
Adjusted R2 control variables  .026  .058  .027  .044  .006  .056 
Adjusted R2 all variables  .126  .107  .261  .144  .063  .331 
Adjusted ∆R2 explanatory va-
riables 
 .100  .049  .234  .100  .057  .275 
df (regression, residual) (13, 4414)  (14, 4364) (13, 4430) (13, 4053) (13, 4380) (13, 3984) 
F 50.231** 38.480** 121.971** 53.569**  23.816 ** 152.912** 
Note. Standardized regressions coefficients (betas) are shown. 
* p < .05     ** p < .01 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 In research conducted by Miceli et al. (2008b) whistleblowers are frequently distinguished from the group of 
employees who were unaware of wrongdoing. Non-observers fall beyond the scope of the current paper given 
that the focus is on the response of employees who observe wrongdoing. 
2
 For example, in the study of Bergman et al. (2002) that examined the response of observers of sexual harass-
ment, the response was limited to reporting, which was defined as the act of informing an organizational authori-
ty of the misdemeanor. The option of approaching the wrongdoer directly was therefore not included. 
3
 For certain types of wrongdoing, such as legal transgressions, it might however be desirable that in addition to 
approaching the wrongdoer(s) directly, the observer report the wrongdoing to management because it is neces-
sary that management sanction the wrongdoer, record the wrongdoing and take measures to correct the wrongdo-
ing and prevent it from occurring again. 
4
 Next to ethical culture, ethical climate is another component of the informal organizational context. Ethical 
climate is usually defined as the perception of employees about what constitutes unethical and ethical behavior in 
the organization (Victor & Cullen, 1988). Some studies have been conducted on the relationship between ethical 
climate and whistleblowing. Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) did research among police agencies in the State of 
Georgia on ethical climates and whistleblowing. Chung et al. (2004) found that auditors are more likely to blow 
the whistle in a “principle-based” organizational climate compared to a “rule-based” organizational climate. Giv-
en the limited scope of the survey employed in the current study, questions regarding ethical climate were not 
included, which could be an interesting direction for future research. 
5
 Version 2 of the Integrity Thermometer was used in this study. Version 1 is the questionnaire as developed and 
presented by Kaptein (1998) and Kaptein and Van Dalen (2000). Version 3 is the questionnaire as further devel-
oped and tested by Kaptein (2008b), which was not available at the time the data for the current study was col-
lected. Version 2 (see, for example, Kaptein and Avelino (2005)) consists of 32 items. The difference between 
Version 1 and Version 2 is, for example, that Version 1 relates the dimensions of ethical culture to three key di-
lemmas organizations face (the dilemmas of the entangled hands, many hands and dirty hands) whereas Version 
2 relates the dimensions of ethical culture to (un)ethical behavior in general. 
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